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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SANDER:
IS IT REALLY ALL ABOUT THE GRADES?
JAMES E. COLEMAN, JR. & MITu GULATI*
Many readers will find The Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law
Firm1 provocative, but this is a necessary response. The racial
paradox that Professor Richard Sander seeks to explain is why even
though minorities and especially blacks are well represented-
overrepresented, he argues, given their numbers in the law student
ranks---at large law firms, they are underrepresented at the senior
associate and partnership ranks. Elite law firms, Sander finds, use
affirmative action to produce racial diversity at the entry level
positions of summer and beginning associates, but they fail to
maintain diversity in the senior associate and equity partnership
levels due to high attrition rates among junior black associates?
The story Sander proffers is something along the following lines:
The data show that grades are the most important element of a law
firm's hiring decisions.' This suggests firms think that grades are an
accurate predictor of success at their institutions. Firms also care
about racial diversity and, therefore, rely upon large racial
preferences to hire black associates. In other words, the grades of the
black associates whom these firms hire are significantly lower than
* Professors, Duke Law School. The authors thank the participants at the North
Carolina Law Review Symposium, especially Judge Harry Edwards and Professors Scott
Baker, John Conley, Elizabeth Gorman, and Laura Beth Nielsen, upon whose comments
they have drawn. The authors also thank Professors Laura Beny, Doriane Coleman,
Stephen Choi, Catherine Fisk, Kimberly Krawiec, Bruce Price, Joyce Sterling, and David
Wilkins for conversations about the issues discussed herein.
This piece was written in response to a draft of Professor Sander's article.
Professor Sander's final version, received by the Review days prior to publication,
eliminated some of the quotations cited herein. Publication deadlines prevented
Professors Coleman and Gulati from revising their piece accordingly. -Eds.
1. Richard H. Sander, The Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1755 (2006).
2. Id. at 1781 & tbl.7.
3. In the interests of brevity, this Response focuses on Sander's analysis of the racial
paradox with respect to black law students and associates because this is where the alleged
racial paradox is most stark.
4. Sander, supra note 1, at 1789.
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those of their white counterparts.5 At the end of the day, however,
Sander finds that black associates, although they are just as interested
in large-firm work as their white colleagues, are a great deal less
successful in advancing to partnership.6
Although we find it wanting in terms of explaining the paradox
that lies at its center,7 aspects of Racial Paradox provide important
contributions to the literature on large law firms. Among these
contributions is its serious and largely successful attempt to document
empirically the racial attrition problem at these firms. Prior work,
especially that in law reviews, is based largely upon rumor and
anecdote.8 Sander, on the other hand, undertakes the complex and
tricky task of drawing conclusions from multiple, large datasets in his
attempt to triangulate this complex problem.9
In addition to documenting attrition problems, ° Sander's data
also help either dispel myths or confirm intuitions on a number of
fronts. For example, Sander demonstrates that minority students are
at least as interested in the practice of corporate law in the large law
firm setting as their white colleagues, puncturing the myth that black
students are disproportionately interested in civil rights and pro bono
work and disproportionately uninterested in large-firm practice." He
also demonstrates that the large corporate law firms engage In
significant affirmative action in their hiring of minority associates.12
Most interesting to the authors of this Response, Sander documents
how the experiences of black associates-in terms of key
developmental factors such as mentorship, quality of assignments,
and training-are perceived by them to be systematically worse than
those of their white colleagues. 3 Specifically, Sander demonstrates
5. Id. at 1785-89.
6. Id. at 1805.
7. See infra notes 30-54 and accompanying text.
8. For an overview of the literature on lawyers and law firms and a discussion of
exceptions to the tendency to use rumor and anecdote, see John M. Conley & Scott Baker,
Fall from Grace or Business as Usual? A Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street
and Main Street, 30 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 783,783 (2005).
9. There are a number of other puzzling aspects of the results that Sander reports to
which readers of his article should pay attention, such as why white women seem relatively
satisfied at these firms despite having significantly lower rates of success in the partnership
tournament than their male counterparts, as well as the dramatically different experiences
of black and Hispanic associates. Finally, as of this writing, Sander has not unpacked the
differences between the experiences of minority male and female associates. Once he
does though, we expect an even more nuanced racial paradox.
10. See Sander, supra note 1, at 1805-08.
11. Id. at 1768-71.
12. Id. at 1778-89.
13. Id. at 1795-1805.
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that black associates are doing more of the grunt or rote work,
receiving less responsibility and client contact, networking less with
the partners at their firms, and consequently becoming more
disillusioned with the firms earlier in their tenures. 4 All of this,
Sander concludes, results in higher attrition rates for black associates
than for associates from any other group.15
The point that Sander emphasizes the most-the one upon which
most of his conclusions are based-is that corporate law firms care
deeply about grades and that the black students these firms hire
systematically have lower grades than their colleagues from other
groups. 6 From this, he concludes, at least implicitly, that the racial
paradox of the elite corporate law firm may be explained best by the
relatively lower law school grades of black associates who are the
beneficiaries of affirmative action. 7 Sander advances this conclusion
even though he admittedly did not take into account the "dynamics
within individual firms."'8 This is both the flaw in Racial Paradox's
analysis and its mischief.
The harm of Sander's article is that it will contribute to the
stereotyping that already undermines the success of black associates
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1750-91.
17. Sander refers to the "large racial preferences," Richard H. Sander, The Racial
Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REV. (draft Apr. 7, 2006) (manuscript at
113, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Sander Draft], received by
black associates, to overcome "the very large disparities in the grade credentials of blacks
hired by large firms compared to whites," id. at 164. The impression he gives is that elite
firms look only at race when hiring black associates, without seriously considering other
indicia of future success, failing to acknowledge that such other factors are considered. He
recognizes, however, that minorities are not the only junior associates hired with lower
grades. Discussing his hypothetical "elite corporate firm called Smith & Jones," Sander,
supra note 1, at 1791, Sander notes that it may hire some "students with weaker grades
who have other appealing attributes, such as winning personalities, obvious leadership
skills, or strong performance in moot court competitions," id. However, he does not
attempt to determine if any of those factors might have influenced the judgment of the
elite firms that the black students were qualified. In addition, Sander does not examine
whether white associates who are hired "with weaker grades" have the same negative
experiences as their black counterparts. While his analysis ignores these lawyers, he does
not imply that they are underqualified. Significantly, there were more white lawyers at
elite firms with lower grades represented in his data samples than there were black lawyers
with lower grades. See, e.g., id. at 1785 tbl.9 (indicating there were 213 white associates
with GPAs below 3.24, but only 59 black associates, and that there were 38 white
associates with GPA's below 3.0 and only 13 black associates). If low grades account for
the bad treatment of black associates, one would expect that the elite firms would also
treat white associates with similarly low grades badly. If they do not, it would point to
race, and not low grades, as the key factor explaining the racial paradox.
18. Id. at 1813.
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in elite corporate law firms. Sander's prior work on affirmative action
received extensive attention in the national press19 and, given this
article is a provocative extension of that prior work, we suspect Racial
Paradox will as well. That means that Sander's article will be one of
the few pieces of academic work that actually gets read and taken
seriously by those outside the academy. To the extent there is
material in his article that will be understood as empirical
confirmation of the lack of qualification of black students, the article
imposes a high cost on those who need no additional obstacles placed
before them.
Racial Paradox paints all black associates with a broad brush. It
acknowledges that some black associates succeed, but does not
explain why. It leaves the impression that only those with relatively
high grades succeed, but does not specifically address the point. Our
experience is that elite corporate law firms do not recruit black
associates from the same range of schools from which they recruit
white associates. Black associates are more likely to be recruited
primarily, if not exclusively, from the most elite law schools. Our
guess is that the elite firms also hire white associates "with weaker
grades" from these same schools.2" Sander does not attempt to
compare the experiences of these two groups of similarly situated
associates, which one would expect to be similar, if merit rather than
stereotyping or discrimination explains the negative experiences of
black associates. In other words, is the white male student with low
grades from Michigan hired by an elite law firm doing better or worse
than the black student from Michigan with the same low grades and
hired at the same firm because of affirmative action? We suspect that
the white student is doing better, perhaps a lot better, in terms of his
likelihood of winning the partnership tournament.
Our claim is that one cannot explain the racial paradox that is the
focus of Sander's article without taking into account the dynamics
within individual firms. Law firms are complex organizations. Lofty
commitments made by hiring committees acting on behalf of the firm
do not necessarily reflect the commitment of important individual
19. See, e.g., John Hechinger, Critics Assail Study of Race, Law Students, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 5, 2004, at B1 ("The research by Prof. Richard H. Sander, scheduled for publication
in this month's Stanford Law Review, turns traditional critiques of affirmative action on
their heads. It is already under assault."); Adam Liptak, For Blacks in Law School, Can
Less Be More?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, § 4, at 3 ("But a recent study published in The
Stanford Law Review by Richard H. Sander, a law professor at the University of
California, Los Angeles, has found a new way to inflame the debate.").
20. Our reading of the University of Michigan Law School Alumni Survey data
supports this conclusion.
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partners. One cannot evaluate the experiences of different groups of
associates in these firms without examining the particular
circumstances that give rise to the experiences themselves. Instead,
Sander himself recognizes that tackling this paradox adequately
requires "extraordinarily systematic case studies of dynamics within
individual firms.,
21
The final step in Sander's article, where he pushes back from the
data and attempts to draw conclusions from it, is the one we suspect
will be the most controversial-it raised the ire of many at the
Symposium. Sander attempts to explain the racial paradox by
working through and testing a number of explanations that scholars
have advanced, ranging from outright discrimination to disinterest
and stereotyping.2 2  Sander concludes-with the caveat that other
forces obviously are at work-that the fact that black associates enter
with significantly lower grades likely plays a key role in the high
attrition rates for black associates.23 We believe that this conclusion
cannot be defended solely on the basis of the data Sander analyzes.
Advancing this conclusion without a more appropriate examination
of the causes of the paradox likely will cause harm. We hope any
harm will be minimized as readers recognize that Sander's article is
but a preliminary look at an important social question. Instead of
harm, the effect of Sander's study will hopefully be a series of serious
follow-up empirical studies into the causes of black attorneys'
attrition from large law firms.
21. Sander, supra note 1, at 1813. Sander may at times be misinterpreting the
significance of some of the data upon which he relies. For example, Table 18 shows that
black associates have a significantly higher volume of pro bono work than white
associates. Id. at 1800 tbl.18. Sander concludes that "[t]he growth and institutionalization
of pro bono work at large firms-and the ability, as measured by Table 18, of black and
Hispanic associates to engage in substantial pro bono practices-indicates a promising sign
of institutional flexibility." Id. at 1817. That conclusion ignores the rest of the data set out
in Table 18. Rather than reflecting a positive accommodation by firms, large amounts of
pro bono work more likely reflect the relative lack of paying work that these associates
have. In the same way, the relatively more time that black and Hispanic associates spend
on recruiting likely reflects the general inclination of the firms to allocate the time of these
associates to less productive activities. Both of these explanations are consistent with the
overall negative experiences reported by black associates.
Another possible misinterpretation of the data by Sander is his suggestion that
black associates may recognize that they are underqualified because a significant
percentage of them believe that race was a factor in their employment. Id. at 1788 tbl.12.
A different explanation of this finding is that it may reflect the intensity of the efforts of
elite firms to recruit black associates. The response, we suspect, is about diversity, not
underqualification.
22. Id. at 1809-19.
23. Id. at 1817-18.
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Part of the answer to the high attrition rate puzzle for black
associates seems to be that they are disproportionately disadvantaged
when training, mentorship opportunities, and meaningful work are
distributed by their firms. Sander speculates that the reason for this is
that black associates have lower grades, and that the senior partners
who control work, training, and mentorship opportunities are aware
of these low grades. 24 These firms make coordinated decisions about
whom they want to hire for entry-level positions, and all of them,
Sander argues, seem to use significant amounts of affirmative action
to increase their hiring of black students for such positions. Inside
the firms though, Sander imagines there is less coordination. There is
rarely a formal assignment process for the most desirable work.
Instead partners pick the associates they want to work on their
projects, although associates "have great entrepreneurial freedom to
secure assignments from other partners. ' 26  Most importantly,
however, partners choose which associates will work on which aspects
of their deals or cases. While some types of work provide lots of
training, other work is mindless and rote. Assuming that grades are
the best available predictor of law firm success, Sander suggests that
senior partners choose to give out scarce training and mentorship
resources to those junior associates with the best chances of success-
those with the highest law school grades-and that those associates
will be disproportionately white because white associates have the
higher grades.27 It is this final stage in Sander's article on which we
focus our six comments.
1. Discrimination, Plain and Simple
Large corporate law firms typically hire a number of associates
right out of law school or judicial clerkships. The firms tell these
associates that, with adjustments for clerkship experiences, they are
all starting at the same point. In other words, firms represent that the
playing field for the "Partnership Tournament" is level. The firms
most certainly do not tell black students that they are starting on a
different track than their white counterparts because of a
presumption that they are underqualified. Yet, Sander's results
suggest that dual tracking by race in fact occurs. Black students start
24. Id. at 1811-16.
25. Id. at 1778-89.
26. Id. at 1810.
27. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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on a track where they get little in the way of mentorship or training.
They receive disproportionately lower-quality assignments, less client
contact, and less contact with their senior partners. They spend
disproportionally more time on nonproductive-for purposes of
advancing in the Partnership Tournament-activities such as pro
bono and recruiting. A much larger fraction of white students, by
contrast, are on a track where they receive generous infusions of
training, meaningful work, and mentoring. Such differential
treatment, based solely upon an assumption that black associates are
presumptively less qualified, is discriminatory.
If anything, Racial Paradox should be required reading for law
firm partners who profess not to know why the attrition rate among
black associates is so high, or why many who do stay inexplicably fall
through the cracks. Sander provides evidence that what is going on is
discriminatory dual tracking.
Sander takes the opposite perspective. He argues that his data
preclude us from "inferr[ing] racist behavior on the part of firms that
have low proportions of minority partners. There is strong evidence
that firms are violating fair employment laws, but the violations are
on behalf of minority hiring, not against it."2 In other words, the
relevant discrimination is the use of affirmative action to favor black
law students at the hiring stage. Even if Sander were right in
characterizing such hiring practices as "discriminatory," it is
irrelevant to what happens to the black associates after they are hired.
The fact that firms hire diverse groups of associates, pay them all the
same salary, tell them implicitly or explicitly that they are all starting at
the same point, and then systematically treat black associates worse
than others in terms of assignments, training, and mentoring because
of a racially based presumption about the black associates' ability, is
racial discrimination. We doubt that any elite law firm would defend
the dual track that Sander documents on the basis of a presumption
that the black associates whom it hires are less qualified than the
white associates hired at the same time and often from the most elite
law schools.29
28. Sander Draft, supra note 17, at 165.
29. In addition, as noted, Sander does not look to see whether white associates with
similarly lower grades are treated as badly as black associates. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text. The law firms certainly would determine the answer to that question
before trying to defend their treatment of black associates on the basis of low grades.
Proof that black lawyers and white lawyers with similarly low grades are not treated
similarly would suggest that the dual track reflects racial discrimination.
2006] 1829
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2. Testing the Claim that Black Associates with Higher Grades
Would Succeed
At the heart of Sander's paper is the assertion that it must be the
case that grades are a good predictor of the qualities that law firms
value-qualities that predict law firm success. 0 The question is how
to test this assertion. Ideally, one would simply take data on those
who actually succeed at these firms and determine whether these
were the individuals with the higher grades in their entry level classes
at the firms. Performing such a test would be onerous because it
would require collecting data from the individual firms on the grades
of partners, and perhaps senior associates, and then comparing those
to the grades of the others in their entering classes.
Absent that data, Sander looks to two datasets that tell us: (1)
the grade levels of a group of Michigan Law School alumni who were
still at law firms with fifty or more lawyers five, ten, and fifteen years
after graduation were progressively higher, creating an inference that
those with higher grades are more likely to survive in these law
firms;31 and (2) that grades are one of the best predictors of income
later in a legal career.32 Sander admits that this is only the first step of
his analysis. More important, the analysis is not adequately on point.
The core question Racial Paradox asks is not whether grades are
good predictors of lifetime income or law firm survival, but whether
the reason for the systematically higher attrition rates of black
associates is that their grades are presumed to be systematically
lower. To test that question, one needs a group of black associates
who are known to have stronger grades, or grades just as good as
their white colleagues, who received good assignments, training, and
mentoring, and another group who were presumed to have lower
grades. Setting up such a test may strike the reader as impossible.
After all, if firms are using affirmative action, is not the negative
presumption always going to apply, even to the subset of black
associates who had grades just as high as their white colleagues? Not
so. We believe the datasets are out there and hope the next group of
researchers who tackle the racial paradox of the corporate law firm
will find and make use of them.
The datasets likely exist because we suspect many black students
already fear the dynamic that Sander describes. They know that even
30. Sander, supra note 1, at 1789-92.
31. Id. at 1792-95.
32. Id.
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if they can find their way into these corporate law firms, some
partners will suspect them of having been the beneficiaries of
affirmative action and, for that reason, will deny them all but grunt
work. If this is true, black students with stronger grades who wish to
avoid the Sander dynamic will search for firms that have a reputation
for hiring black students with the highest grades-those elite firms
seen as the most racially friendly. At these firms, because these are
the black students with grades high enough to compete with the best
of their white counterparts, and because everyone at the firm knows
this, any presumption that these associates benefited from affirmative
action should be minimal. A low success rate for black associates at
these firms would pose a challenge to the Sander hypothesis.
Our reason for suggesting the foregoing test is not wholly
theoretical. First, the two authors of this Response are racial
minorities who went into large corporate law firms after graduation,
so the dynamic that Sander describes is one that we thought hard
about at the time. Second, among the sources that Sander cites
prominently is an article by Alan Jenkins discussing the high attrition
rate of black associates at Cleary Gottlieb.33 Cleary was the firm
where many of the top black law students wanted to work-at least
those from the Harvard Law School-when one of the authors was
graduating from law school in 1994 because it was perceived as more
friendly towards minorities than many of the other firms. So, to read
that the attrition rates at Cleary for that cohort of black associates
had been abysmal is jarring in light of Sander's hypothesis.34
Stated more formally, the dynamic Sander describes will operate
differently at different firms depending upon the amount of
affirmative action a firm uses. Therefore, if his "affirmative action
stigma" effect is the driving force for minority attrition, this
33. Id. at 1767 & n.53 (citing Alan Jenkins, Losing the Race, AM. LAW., Oct. 2001, at
90).
34. The other author was a partner at an elite corporate firm and personally witnessed
the dual track that Sander's article describes. What is noteworthy for this author is the
route by which black lawyers have become partners in his former firm. Elite law firms
today make partners either by promotion from within (the traditional way) or by bringing
them in laterally. In the former case, the firm develops the associates through the work
assigned, training, and mentoring. At the time of the partnership decision, this ensures the
firm that the associate has the skills and other qualities necessary to perform well as a
partner. In the case of lateral partners, the firm makes this determination based upon the
lawyer's accomplishments outside the firm. What is striking in the firm in which one of us
was a partner is how many black partners have been laterals, including some who started
at the firm as associates and left; only one black partner in the firm was promoted from
within in the traditional way, starting as an entry level associate and remaining until he
became a partner.
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differential should correlate with the differentials in affirmative
action rates. Collecting this type of data will not be easy, but the goal
is worth the effort. Stopping at the first step in the analysis, but still
making provocative claims about what causes the racial paradox,
creates the danger of giving added strength to an insidious
presumption that already disadvantages black associates under a
different name.
The underlying point here is that if the dynamic in elite firms is
the one that Sander describes, there will be second-order effects in
terms of black associates recognizing the dynamic and taking steps to
ameliorate it. Evidence of those steps should be visible. Once again,
the question is what happens to the black associates with good
grades? If the dynamic that Sander describes is right, these black
lawyers should use every opportunity to signal their grades. Black
associates should hand in a copy of their law school transcript with
every assignment. If they were on the law review, they could have a
framed picture of their law review class displayed in a prominent
position in their office. These are easy and cheap signals. If the
perception that black law students have bad grades is the problem,
the ones with good grades will engage in this type of signaling and
solve the problem, at least with respect to themselves. We suspect
black associates with high grades in fact are not engaging in this type
of behavior."
The activities in which black associates are disproportionately
engaging are likely of a different sort. These activities are of the
stereotype-negation type. To the extent these black associates fear
there is a stereotype of black men as being hostile and oversensitive
about race, they may spend a disproportionate amount of time
socializing with their white colleagues and attempting to persuade
them that they are not one of those hostile, oversensitive types. If
black associates fear that the perception is that they are intellectually
inferior, regardless of their grades, they may try to take on more
difficult assignments than their white counterparts with the same
grades.
There is also the matter of the law firm response. Sander's thesis
posits that law firms lose money because they refuse to mentor black
students with good grades-lumping these students into the category
35. If they are engaging in these relatively cheap signaling activities though, then high-
grade black students should find it easy to show themselves as such and, according to the
Sander theory, should succeed at the law firms at about the same rates as their white
colleagues with similarly high grades.
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of affirmative action hires. In Sander's framework, firms lose out on
these high performing black students because they end up quitting.
But a rational firm-even one that did not want to mentor low-grade
black students-would want to mentor the black associates with high
grades, particularly if they really did care about diversity, as so many
claim. It is easy for the firm to determine which students are which.
Once again, grades are not that difficult to observe. 36 If they were all
that important, the firm could easily ensure that every partner could
identify the associates with the high grades. We are fairly certain this
practice is not used. Why not? The answer surely has to be that
something other than grades is driving assignments.
3. The "Fell Through the Cracks" Story
The racial paradox is that while firms aggressively hire black
associates at the entry level, they do not retain them.37 Within a few
years of being hired, black associates are disappointed with the ways
in which their careers are progressing and begin looking for exit
options. Sander proposes a structural explanation for this
phenomenon. The loose manner in which these firms are
organized-where partners and associates, in a sense, choose each
other-results in black associates falling through the cracks.38 The
partners may collectively desire a diverse pool of associates for the
firm, but when it comes to their individual projects and the most
desirable work, Sander claims, they want the best associates and
generally do not think that black associates fall into this category. A
key element of Sander's story then concerns the "looseness" of the
internal assignment processes at these firms.
Firms are not all the same in terms of internal structures. The
structure at some firms is looser than that at others. For example,
there are firms that rotate junior associates through a variety of
departments for at least two years before those associates are allowed
to specialize. There are other firms where assignments are the
product of a free market matching system from day one. If Sander's
hypothesis is correct, we should see differential attrition rates for
black associates that are a function of differential structures. Further,
36. Unless of course what Sander means by "grades" is some nuanced understanding
of law school transcripts that takes into consideration the difficulty level of the courses,
the material covered, the personal situation of the student and on and on. We are
unaware of any law firms that perform such a nuanced evaluation of grades.
37. Sander, supra note 1, at 1759.
38. Id. at 1810.
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as black students come to understand the dynamic that Sander
describes, one should see disproportionate numbers of black students
migrating towards firms with more formal assignment systems; that is,
firms where there is a lower likelihood of falling through the cracks.
If we do not see that, it suggests that the problem of attrition may not
be a function of the informality of internal assignment structures.
4. Diversity as a Source of Status
A key element of Sander's thesis is that overt discrimination does
not seem to explain the lack of senior black lawyers at corporate law
firms.39 Discrimination, Sander suggests, is belied by the aggressive
recruiting and hiring of black associates at the entry level. The
aggressive use of affirmative action for entry-level positions seems to
suggest that the firms have good intentions vis-A-vis their black
associates, but that things simply do not work out for reasons beyond
the firm's control.
We suggest the possibility of a different story. Firms, and
especially the larger and more elite firms, care about status. One way
to acquire status is to do expensive things that lower-status firms will
find difficult to do. To the extent that there is but a small pool of
black associates available for the top law firms, these firms may view
employment of these associates as a source of status-a dynamic that
becomes more plausible in a context where the entering associates are
more attracted to firms that are considered diverse. If the purpose of
hiring these black associates is largely a means to acquire status, and
if status comes from a minority group's numerical presence rather
than its success within the firm, then one should not be surprised to
see the firm investing little in the group's training and mentoring.
David Wilkins's forthcoming book on the history of blacks in
corporate law firms documents how real this story was in the days
when black lawyers were first admitted into these firms.4" A key
39. Id. at 1818.
40. For an explication of this point in the context of the broader literature on lawyers
and status, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Form as Status and Signal, 40 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 977, 1004-05 (2005) (citing DAVID WILKINS, THE BLACK BAR: THE
LEGACY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (forthcoming 2007)). In a recent article, Laura Beny
takes a somewhat different spin on the analogous issue of why law firms appear to spend
significant resources on diversity initiatives like engaging diversity trainers and yet seem to
be making little progress in terms of actual numbers. See Laura N. Beny, Reflections on
the Diversity-Performance Nexus Among Elite American Law Firms: Toward a Theory
of a Diversity Norm (Sept. 6, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North
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element during this period was the desire for status (some of which
came from being seen as "doing good" in the Civil Rights era) that
opened doors. Those lawyers, however, precisely because their value
to the firms was in terms of status, rarely got training and mentoring.
Perhaps that same dynamic, albeit on a larger scale, is still at play.4
5. "To make partner at an elite law firm, go to a law school where
you will earn high grades."
Sander makes much of the fact that law firms have "weaned
themselves from a predominant reliance on elite schools as a source
for young lawyers."'42 Instead, he argues, firms now try to "balance
school eliteness with school performance to determine the predictors
of law firm success."43  From this he suggests that black students-
indeed all students who receive weaker grades at elite law schools-
would be better off attending a second- or third-tier law school where
they would get stronger grades than attending an elite school and not
performing as well." This claim is made without corroboration,
either generally or specifically for black students. We doubt this
claim for two reasons.
First, Sander makes no attempt to determine if the experience of
white junior associates who graduated from law schools from which
Carolina Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=777504. Beny hypothesizes
that the firms may care little about the numbers, but may be spending on diversity to
signal to the market their "cooperative reputation" (put differently, low discount rate). Id.
at 23-27.
41. This dynamic is consistent with some of Sander's data. For example, using black
associates to recruit signals to white lawyers who care about diversity that the firm
embraces diversity. The same is true of permitting black associates to spend extraordinary
amounts of time on visible pro bono activities. One also would expect these firms to buy
tables at public interest events and invite their black associates to attend, along with
prominent members of the firm.
42. Sander Draft, supra note 17, at 164.
43. Id.
44. Sander hypothesizes that:
[T]he net result of these shifts was a new hiring calculus among elite firms. Rather
than simply hire from the best schools, the firms began to evaluate the tradeoffs
between high grades and school eliteness. Firms discovered that graduates of
second-tier or even third-tier schools with top grades were succeeding and often
making partner, and over time they gauged and calibrated the mix of grades and
eliteness that were sufficient to pass muster and prosper at their firms. The most
obvious result was a dramatic broadening of the range of schools from which elite
firms drew associates ....
Sander, supra note 1, at 1778. These are bold assertions. If wrong, a chunk of Sander's
thesis comes into question.
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their firms do not traditionally recruit are treated as well as white
students who graduated from the traditionally recruited law schools.
Are white associates from these nontraditional law schools given the
same challenging assignments, the same training, and the same
mentoring as white associates from the traditional schools from which
the firms recruit? Or is there a presumption among partners in these
firms-who likely graduated from the traditional law schools-that
the graduates of these second and third-tier schools are
underqualified, even though their grades are high? Is Sander correct
that these associates are "succeeding and often making partner,"'45 or,
are these associates on another side track?'
Second, nothing in Sander's data suggest that black law students
at lower-tiered law schools are being or would be hired by elite law
firms, even if their grades are high. Our experience is that elite law
firms continue to recruit minority associates almost exclusively from
the elite schools from which they traditionally have recruited their
most successful white associates. If students from lower-tiered
schools also are subjected to a presumption that they are
underqualified, black students at such a school would experience a
double burden. For this reason, except in the most exceptional case,
it seems to us unlikely that elite firms are recruiting many black
students from lower-tiered schools. This too can be tested.47 If elite
firms recruit black lawyers from a narrow range of law schools,
Sander's proposed solution to the racial paradox would serve only to
severely reduce the number of black associates at the elite law firms.
Given that likelihood, why would any rational black student give up
the known benefits of a degree from an elite law school to roll the
dice at a lower-tiered school from which his or her opportunities
likely would be significantly reduced?4 8
45. Id.
46. The experience of one of the authors suggests that these associates also are the
victims of lower expectations within elite law firms, and that they experience some of the
same negative consequences as black associates. They likely will report "fewer projects,
less training, less mentoring, less social interaction with partners, and a lower level of
responsibility on their assignments. In other words, they [will] seem to experience a sort
of benign neglect at the firm." Sander Draft, supra note 17, at 165.
47. At one of the authors' former law firms, the overwhelming majority of black
lawyers were from Harvard, Yale, Michigan, Columbia, the University of Virginia, and the
University of Pennsylvania, with a substantial majority from Harvard and Yale. These are
the law schools from which the firm traditionally recruited its best white associates.
48. Sander notes, for example, that "[n]ot surprisingly, GPA thresholds for those
going into large firms were lower at the elite University of Michigan than at the broader
cross-section of schools represented in the [Bar Passage Study] data." Sander, supra note
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6. It Is About Firm Dynamics
Professor Sander acknowledges that disentangling the role of
merit and stereotype discrimination would "require extraordinarily
systematic case studies of dynamics within individual firms, studying
the incoming credentials of associates, the assignments they receive,
the evaluations of their assignments, and the evolution of their work
load."49 Given that no one seems to be doing these studies or even
plans to do so, we fear that Sander's hypothesis about grades and
merit being the root cause of the racial paradox, as opposed to
stereotyping, will fill the vacuum for a significant period of time. Our
goal, therefore, is to attempt to suggest why even a basic
understanding of internal firm dynamics at large law firms brings
Sander's hypothesis into question.
Racial Paradox makes a number of debatable assumptions about
what goes on in elite law firms. Sander cannot imagine, for example,
that firms would "use aggressive pro-minority preferences in hiring,
only to engage in racial discrimination once associates arrive.""° He
assumes any such discrimination would be "open," but his data
suggest that what is going on within these firms is discrimination in
the guise of benign neglect, not open discrimination. This is evident
from Sander's statement that the "disturbing patterns are ones of
disengagement, not overburdening."'"
Sander assumes that black associates who are not receiving good
work because of discrimination can easily identify racist partners who
might discriminate, asserting that associates enjoy "great
entrepreneurial freedom to secure assignments from other partners
and senior associates in the firm, and likewise many different partners
can seek out the help of particular associates."52  This assertion
ignores how internal markets for work operate at these firms.
First, entrepreneurial freedom matters only if partners with
desirable work are willing to share it. An associate trying to escape a
partner who is not providing him or her good work may find few
other partners responsive to calls for work. A bad experience with
one partner may poison the well with all partners. Associates quickly
1, at 1787. Thus, even for white students, going to an elite school broadened the
opportunities upon graduation, even for those with weaker grades.
49. Id. at 1813.
50. Id. at 1809.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1810.
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develop reputations within elite firms. A partner who concludes,
rightly or wrongly, that an associate is underqualified will report this
conclusion informally to other partners. It is unlikely that another
partner with "good" work will waste it on someone who has been
declared on the wrong track.
Second, Sander assumes partners will judge the work of all
associates fairly even if they think the associate is underqualified. We
doubt that this is often the case. Our experience is that partners will
often evaluate an associate's work consistent with their expectations
or presumptions. When the work comes from an associate whom the
partner suspects is underqualified, the partner likely will find
deficiencies in the work that confirm his or her suspicions; in some
cases, the partner will actively look for such deficiencies. The same
errors in the work of an associate whom the partner assumes is a star
may be minimized and treated as aberrational. In the former case,
the errors, no matter how insignificant, may appear prominently in a
formal evaluation; certainly they are reported informally through the
grapevine. In the latter case, however, the errors are used to teach
and thereafter will likely be forgotten. An associate for whom the
firm has low expectations may never recover from a mistake, no
matter how understandable or trivial it was. What constitutes merit
under such circumstances?
Third, Sander assumes that firms can "ensure that every minority
associate has an effective mentor, or that assignments are distributed
with greater care."53 Our experience suggests that neither assumption
is valid. Firms often find it difficult to ensure that an associate has a
meaningful mentor. The best mentors are those who take a personal
interest in a junior associate and are willing to put time into
mentoring. Unfortunately, law firms are often organized so that
individual partners have no personal responsibility for poor
mentoring or bad assignments. Moreover, most partners will not be
inclined to commit time to meaningful mentoring before first
concluding that the associate is worth the effort. Additionally, formal
mentoring programs, like formal assigning systems, do not always
eliminate the problems experienced by black associates. That
requires a personal commitment by the partners who are effective
mentors and those who have good work to share.
Sander concludes his article by calling on elite firms to
"pressur[e] law schools to modify policies that cause blacks to be so
53. Sander Draft, supra note 17, at 165.
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heavily concentrated in the bottom of their classes. ' '54  This is
Sander's agenda. If law firms wish to understand the racial paradox
about which Sander writes, they would do better to conduct their own
systematic study of the experiences of black associates. Sander's data
show that black associates are treated less fairly than white associates.
As a result, they leave the firms earlier than white associates. Is this
really a paradox?
Empirical work is difficult. It is easy to attack because critics can
always hypothesize some alternate method of testing that addresses a
problem more directly and assert, without basis, that they claim such
data are easy to collect. The problem is that those throwing stones at
the empirical work rarely are either unable or unwilling to do the
inevitably hard work of collecting such data. We have done our share
of stone throwing in this response, but that should not take away from
the fact that Professor Sander has identified a real problem that needs
serious study, and that his study has added considerably to the limited
body of available, public research, even though his conclusions are, at
best, premature.
54. Id. at 166.
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